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#proofofconcept

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Selhosted P2P E2EE File Transfer & Messaging PWA

positive-intentions.com

* #OpenSource
* #CrossPlatform
* #PWA
* #iOS, #Android, #Desktop (self compile)
* App store, Play store (coming soon)
* Desktop
* #Windows, #MacOS, #Linux (self compile)
* run `index.html` on any modern #browser
* #Decentralized
* #Secure
* #NoCookies
* #P2P #encrypted
* No registration
* No installing
* #Messaging
* Group Messaging (coming soon)
* Text Messaging
* #Multimedia Messaging
* #Screensharing (on desktop browsers)
* Offline Messaging (in #research phase)
* #FileTransfer
* #VideoCalls
* #DataOwnership
* #SelfHosted
* GitHub pages Hosting
* #LocalOnly storage

Check them out!

(Degoogled links to the apps)
- P2P Chat: chat.positive-intentions.com
- P2P File: file.positive-intentions.com
- Encrypted drive storage: dim.positive-intentions.com/?p

- GitHub: github.com/positive-intentions

IMPORTANT NOTES (PLEASE READ!):
* These are NOT products. It's for #testing and #demonstration purposes only.
* They have NOT been reviewed or audited. Do NOT use for sensitive data.
* All functionality demonstrated is experimental.
* This is NOT meant to replace robust solutions like #VeraCrypt, #Simplexchat, #Signal, #Whatsapp, #wetransfer. It's just a #proofofconcept to show what's possible with #browser #APIs.

(Boosts appreciated)

positive-intentionsDecentralized P2P Chat & File Transfer - Secure Messaging Without Central Servers | positive-intentionsExperience secure P2P chat, file transfer, and video calls without registration. Built on decentralized architecture with end-to-end encryption and complete data ownership.

File encryption with a browser.

I've been exploring the #WebCryptoAPI and I'm impressed!

When combined with the #FileSystemAPI, it offers a seemingly secure way to #encrypt and #store files directly on your device. Think #localstorage, but with #encryption!

I know #webapps can have #security vulnerabilities since the code is served over the web, so I've #OpenSourced my demo! You can check it out, and it should even work if #selfhosted on #GitHubPages.

Live Demo: dim.positive-intentions.com/?p

Demo Code: github.com/positive-intentions

Hook Code: github.com/positive-intentions

IMPORTANT NOTES (PLEASE READ!):
* This is NOT a product. It's for #testing and #demonstration purposes only.
* It has NOT been reviewed or audited. Do NOT use for sensitive data.
* The "password encryption" currently uses a hardcoded password. This is for demonstration, not security.
* This is NOT meant to replace robust solutions like #VeraCrypt. It's just a #proofofconcept to show what's possible with #browser #APIs.

dim.positive-intentions.com@storybook/core - Storybook

React-like functional webcomponents, but with vanilla HTML, JS and CSS

Introducing Dim – a new #Framework that brings #ReactJS-like functional #JSX-syntax with #VanillaJS. Check it out here:
🔗 Project: github.com/positive-intentions
🔗 Website: dim.positive-intentions.com

My journey with #WebComponents started with Lit, and while I appreciated its native browser support (less #Tooling!), coming from #ReactJS, the class components felt like a step backward. The #FunctionalProgramming approach in React significantly improved my #DeveloperExperience and debugging flow.

So, I set out to build a thin, functional wrapper around #Lit, and Dim is the result! It's a #ProofOfConcept right now, with "main" #Hooks similar to React, plus some custom ones like useStore for #EncryptionAtRest. (Note: #StateManagement for encryption-at-rest is still unstable and currently uses a hardcoded password while I explore #Passwordless options like #WebAuthn/#Passkeys).

You can dive deeper into the #Documentation and see how it works here:
📚 Dim Docs: positive-intentions.com/docs/c

This #OpenSource project is still in its early stages and very #Unstable, so expect #BreakingChanges. I've already received valuable #Feedback on some functions regarding #Security, and I'm actively investigating those. I'm genuinely open to all feedback as I continue to develop it!

GitHubGitHub - positive-intentions/dimContribute to positive-intentions/dim development by creating an account on GitHub.
Replied in thread

@mrgrumpymonkey it is.

One can repartition Windows installations on the fly whilst running (and even then there are tools like #Wubi that made it easy to setup #dualboot #Linux & #Windows.

  • ISOLINUX does allow for "load image into RAM and boot" setups. I literally use that on @OS1337 because no system that can boot it will have > 16 MB RAM anyway ( 8 MB is the hard limit for bare linux kernel) so merely making Windows' bootloader to chainload #isolinux to load that image in RAM and yeet it isn't out of the question.

I just have neither a #Windows machine nor time and spoons to make such a tool, much less to basically create even said #ProofOfConcept "#Malware"

positive-intentions.com/blog/i

id like to share some details about how my app works so you can discover/give me feedback on my app. id like to have wording in my app to say something like "most secure chat app in the world"... i probably cant do that because it doesnt qualify.

im not an expert on #cyberSecurity. im sure there are many gaps in my knowlege in this domain.

using #javascript, i initially created a fairly basic #chatApp using using #peerjs to create #encrypted #webrtc #connections. this was then easily enhanced by exchanging additional #encryption #keys from #cryptography functions built into browsers (#webcrypto api) to add a redundent layer of encryption. a #diffieHelman key #exchange is done over #webrtc (which can be considered #secure when exchanged over public channels) to create #serverless #p2p #authentication.

- i sometimes recieve feedback like "javascript is inherently insecure". i disagree with this and have #openedSource my #cryptography module. its basically a thin wrapper around vanilla cryptography functions of a #browser (webcrypto api).

- another concern for my kind of app (#PWA) is that the developer may introduce malicious code. this is an important point for which i open sourced the project and give instructions for #selfhosting. selhosting this app has some unique features. unlike many other #selfhosted #projects, this app can be hosted on #githubPages (instructions are provided in the readme). im also working towards having better support for running the index.html directly without a static server.

- to prevent things like browser extensions, the app uses strict #CSP headers to prevent #unauthorised code from running. #selfhosting users should take note of this when setting up their own instance.

- i received feedback the #Signal/#Simplex protocol is great. completely undertsandable and agree, but wonder if im reducing the #complexity by working with #webrtc. while it has its many flaws, i think risks can be reasonable mitigated if the #cryptography functions are implemented correctly. (all data out is #encrypted and all data in is #decrypted on-the-fly)

- the key detail that makes this approach unique, is because as a #webapp, unlike other solutions, users have a choice of using any #device/#os/#browser. while a webapp can have nuanced #vulnerabilities, i think by #openSourcing and providing instructions for #selfhosting and instructions to #build for various #platforms, it can provide a reasonable level of #security.

i think if i stick to the principle of avoiding using any kind of "required" service provider (myself included) and allowing the #frontend and the peerjs-server to be #hosted #independently, im on track for creating a #chatSystem with the "fewest moving parts". i hope you will agree this is true #p2p and i hope i can use this as a step towards true #privacy and #security. #security might be further improved by using a trusted #VPN.

while there are several similar apps out there like mine. i think mine is distinctly a different approach. so its hard to find #bestPractices for the functionalities i want to achieve. in particular #security practices to use when using #p2p technology.

(note: this app is an #unstable, #experiment, #proofOfConcept and not ready to replace any other app or service. It's far from finished and provided for #testing and #demo purposes only. This post is to get #feedback on the progress to determine if i'm going in the right direction for a secure chat app)

positive-intentions · Introducing Decentralized Chat | positive-intentionsAre you tired of compromising your privacy and security when sharing files online? What if there was a way to transfer data that was not only secure and efficient but also put you in complete control? Imagine a file sharing solution that combines cutting-edge encryption with the power of decentralized technology, all while being accessible from any device.
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Il progetto -mentre scrivo- è in stato embrionale; con scarso qualcosa di visibile a schermo.

MA... Mi sono già occupato di una prima fase di analisi, ho esplorato qualche approccio implementativo e ho realizzato un paio di #ProofOfConcept differenti.
Molte delle scelte progettuali e tecnologiche -quindi- sono state fatte.

Userò i prossimi giorni per portare in pari il resoconto con lo stato attuale del progetto, pubblicando una serie di post dietro l'altro.

Allacciare le cinture! Si parte! 🚂

@panic #Audion (Viewer) as #AppleMusic controller is just awesome!

There is a github repo with some basic changes need to do to make it work: github.com/zydeco/audion/tree/

I build my self a version based on the lastest sources (gitlab.com/panicinc/audion).

Sadly there are a few bugs. For example:
- The scrolling song title breaks out
- The interface settings dialog doesn’t work - it’s just a placeholder

Replied in thread

@lunch So you just admitted that you vomitted #FUD into my mentions without evidence?

If you're so smart, then why don't you sell your #exploit / #ProofOfConcept / #Whitepaper to the highest bidder?

  • I'm shure #Zerodium and all the LEAs would try to outbid each other...

Alas, your messages are just hot air, and not substantiated by anything...

At best your info is 2+ years outdated...

Kann #Sharkey auch #Video? #proofofconcept

In dem Zusammenhang etwas Background:

Ich habe mit dem Besitzer des Autos eine Stunde vor dem Teil gestanden - das hat seit 1957 80346 km auf der Uhr ("erste Umdrehung!"), braucht 10 ltr/100km und hat 45 PS. Damals war das der "Mercedes des kleinen Mannes".
(Mädels fuhren brav damals auf dem Beifahrersitz)
Der Artikel erscheint morgen in der Zeitung und unsere fu**ing Website ist nicht in der Lage, hochformatige Videos einzubinden. "Aber das ist doch sowieso für Instagram...!" - Ja, klar! Aber die Menschen, die sich an solche Autos eher erinnern nicht! Und die Verweildauer auf einem Reel ist ... fünf Sekunden?
#zielgruppe #medien #mediengestaltung

Continued thread

Palo Alto Networks released additional details about CVE-2024-3400: the fact that it is a combination of two bugs in PAN-OS; how an attacker was exploiting it; how disabling telemetry initially worked; and how they fixed it. The timeline from discovery to remediation encompasses the whole blog post. Overall a comprehensive after-action review from a company that notified the public almost immediately of an exploited zero-day. 🔗paloaltonetworks.com/blog/2024

Palo Alto Networks Blog · More on the PAN-OS CVE-2024-3400By Chandan B.N.
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Cisco released 3 security advisories:

  • CVE-2024-20356 (8.7 high) Cisco Integrated Management Controller Web-Based Management Interface Command Injection Vulnerability
  • CVE-2024-20373 (5.3 medium) Cisco IOS and IOS XE Software SNMP Extended Named Access Control List Bypass Vulnerability
  • CVE-2024-20295 (8.8 high) Cisco Integrated Management Controller CLI Command Injection Vulnerability

Please note that a proof of concept was publicly disclosed for CVE-2024-20295 before it was patched, making this a zero-day. The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any malicious use of the vulnerabilities that were described in these advisories. But don't take my word for it, go check them out yourself.

CiscoCisco Security Advisory: Cisco Integrated Management Controller Web-Based Management Interface Command Injection VulnerabilityA vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco Integrated Management Controller (IMC) could allow an authenticated, remote attacker with Administrator-level privileges to perform command injection attacks on an affected system and elevate their privileges to root. This vulnerability is due to insufficient user input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted commands to the web-based management interface of the affected software. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to elevate their privileges to root. Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability. This advisory is available at the following link:https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-cimc-cmd-inj-bLuPcb

Cisco zero-day (PoC publicly disclosed): Cisco Integrated Management Controller CLI Command Injection Vulnerability CVE-2024-20295 (8.8 high) 🔗 sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/securi

A vulnerability in the CLI of the Cisco Integrated Management Controller (IMC) could allow an authenticated, local attacker to perform command injection attacks on the underlying operating system and elevate privileges to root. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have read-only or higher privileges on an affected device.

This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by submitting a crafted CLI command. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to elevate privileges to root.

The Cisco PSIRT is aware that proof-of-concept exploit code is available for the vulnerability that is described in this advisory.

CiscoCisco Security Advisory: Cisco Integrated Management Controller CLI Command Injection VulnerabilityA vulnerability in the CLI of the Cisco Integrated Management Controller (IMC) could allow an authenticated, local attacker to perform command injection attacks on the underlying operating system and elevate privileges to root. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have read-only or higher privileges on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by submitting a crafted CLI command. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to elevate privileges to root.  Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this vulnerability. This advisory is available at the following link:https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-cimc-cmd-inj-mUx4c5AJ
Continued thread

In case you missed it, Palo Alto Networks updated their security advisory in terms of product and mitigation guidance, exploit status, and PAN-OS fix availability: 🔗 security.paloaltonetworks.com/

  • Exploitation status: Proof of concepts for this vulnerability have been publicly disclosed by third parties.
  • Workarounds and mitigations: In earlier versions of this advisory, disabling device telemetry was listed as a secondary mitigation action. Disabling device telemetry is no longer an effective mitigation. Device telemetry does not need to be enabled for PAN-OS firewalls to be exposed to attacks related to this vulnerability.
  • Solution:
    • - 10.2.6-h3 (Released 4/16/24)
    • - 11.0.3-h10 (Released 4/16/24)
    • - 11.0.2-h4 (Released 4/16/24)
    • - 11.1.0-h3 (Released 4/16/24)
Palo Alto Networks Product Security Assurance · CVE-2024-3400 PAN-OS: Arbitrary File Creation Leads to OS Command Injection Vulnerability in GlobalProtectA command injection as a result of arbitrary file creation vulnerability in the GlobalProtect feature of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software for specific PAN-OS versions and distinct feature configurat...

Rhino Security Labs disclosed vulnerability details and proofs of concept for CVE-2024-2448 (8.4 high) authenticated command injection and CVE-2024-2449* (7.5 high) Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) protection bypass in Progress Kemp Loadmaster. The CSRF could be combined with the command injection and leveraged to execute commands on LoadMaster load balancers by targeting a user of the administration web user interface (WUI). h/t @buherator 🔗 rhinosecuritylabs.com/research

Rhino Security Labs · CVE-2024-2448: Authenticated Command Injection In Progress Kemp LoadMaster - Rhino Security LabsThis blog covers 2 vulnerabilities discovered by Rhino Security Labs in Kemp LoadMaster load balancers: CVE-2024-2448 and CVE-2024-2449.

Akamai provides vulnerability details on CVE-2023-35628 (8.1 high, disclosed 12 December 2023 by Microsoft, Windows MSHTML Platform Remote Code Execution Vulnerability), which they describe as "Windows path parsing memory corruption." They start with the background of the exploited zero-day from March 2023: CVE-2023-23397 and how MapUrlToZone adds a new attack surface. The blog post includes a proof of concept for CVE-2023-35628 and a warning that more MapUrlToZone bypasses may exist. 🔗 akamai.com/blog/security-resea